NOW SUPERSEDED See http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/logical-geography.html
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I've just joined this list (despite having been a philosopher for at least 45 years) so I am not sure what sorts of postings are regarded as acceptable. This is a request for comments and criticisms. This message is also publicly available here: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/ryle-questions.html For many years I thought I understood what Ryle meant by 'logical geography' e.g. when he wrote in The Concept of Mind (page 7): 'The philosophical arguments which constitute this book are intended not to increase what we know about minds, but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge which we already possess.' I thought I was doing the same sort of thing in much of my own work, though using different conceptual tools, as explained below. However I have recently realised that there are two different kinds of analyses and I think Ryle was talking about one and I about another, for which I have recently begun to use the phrase 'logical topography'. The difference can be compared with describing how some terrain is divided up into regions for some social or political purpose (logical geography) as opposed to describing the features of the terrain that exist independently of that division and which, for some purposes, may subserve or subvert particular divisions (logical topography). An example of analysis of logical geography might be an analysis of a collection of colloquial concepts used to describe different kinds of stuff (iron, carbon, water, fire, etc.) in some linguistic community. A contrasting analysis of logical topography would start from a scientific theory of what matter is which explains the different forms it can take, from which we can generate a survey of varieties of matter, and then consider the various naturally grouped subsets and fracture-lines which support different ways of classifying kinds of stuff, e.g. on the basis of their atomic/molecular constitution, possibly combined with resulting physical and chemical dispositions. The use of the atomic theory of matter to generate the periodic table of the elements would be an example. (The logical topography does not uniquely identify some 'correct' logical geography. Whether isotopes should all have different names, or the same name with different numerical subscripts, e.g. carbon12, carbon14, is probably a matter of convenience. The current nomenclature simultaneously reflects the similarities and the differences between the isotopes.) Another example is the use of evolutionary history and unobvious physical and behavioural features rather than superficial physical appearance and behaviour as basis for classifying species of animals. This led some things once called fish to be re-labelled mammals. That kind of scientific advance can cause us to 'rectify' the logical geography in a manner that is different from Ryle's way. His way depended simply on revealing inconsistencies and confusions in the current system without introducing any new explanatory theory. The particular kind of logical topography I have been investigating over many years is, in contrast, based on an attempt to develop a (generative) theory of (virtual machine) information processing architectures underlying different sorts of minds and showing how different architectures support different sets of properties, states, events, processes and causal interactions. (As if we had multiple periodic tables for matter, not just one.) Thus for each architecture (an ant's mind, a bat's mind, cat's mind, a newborn infant's mind, a toddler's mind, an adult philosopher's mind (various sorts)) there will be a different logical topography, each supporting different kinds of logical geographies used by different linguistic communities, depending on what the people in those communities know or think they know about the realities of those minds. (A logical geography can be used that includes fantasy elements such as certain romantic or theological notions of 'free will' -- unlike the everyday notion and the legal notion of 'free will'.) I don't know if all that suffices to make clear what I think the difference is between logical topography and logical geography (it's my first draft sketchy specification of some logical geography of philosophical analysis, based on hunches about the logical topography of the terrain common to science and philosophy). I suspect Ryle never thought about this difference. But I also suspect that if he had, he might have enjoyed broadening his own adventures and explorations to include study of logical topography. Perhaps the idea of some reality underlying the logical geography was already implicit in his determination to 'rectify' logical geography, for that implied that something could make a particular system of logical geography correct or incorrect. My questions for this philosophy list are: (a) does this distinction make sense, and if not what's wrong with it? (b) is the notion of 'logical topography' just my name for something that's already well known under a different name? (My interdisciplinary interests have prevented me keeping up with all relevant philosophical literature.) (c) does anyone who knows/knew Ryle better than I do know whether I am right in saying his focus was on logical geography rather than logical topography? Or did he perhaps accommodate both under his label? I suspect the work he did in later life attempting to develop a theory of hierarchies of dispositions that could account for some of the rich and diverse mental phenomena he was studying might be construed as an attempt to construct an explanatory theory that would generate the logical topography of the terrain. In this, he nearly (re-)invented Artificial Intelligence and the ideas of cognitive virtual machines implemented in physical machines. I heard him give a couple of talks on that stuff, but I did not then understand what he was doing, perhaps because he needed better conceptual tools for the task. I have an online draft discussion paper on all this here: http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/logical-geography.html (or just give 'logical topography geography' to google). Comments and criticisms welcome. I hope I've not spoilt anyone's new year. Aaron == Aaron Sloman http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~axs/
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Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science
The University of Birmingham