School of Computer Science THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM CoSy project

Research Evaluation/Excellence Framework (REF)?
or
Research Monitoring Framework (RMF)?
Aaron Sloman
Installed: 2 Mar 2008
Last updated: 2 Mar 2008

This is http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/research-evaluation.html

A summary of these points, with a link here, was published online in Times Higher Education
on 2 Mar 2008, as a comment on Ian Marshall's article "Hefce's Hobson's choice", published on
28th Feb 2008.


Background

    HEFCE (The Higher Education Funding Council for England) recently
    announced proposals for replacing the RAE (Research Assessment
    Exercise) with a new REF (Research Excellence Framework), in the
    hopes of saving effort and costs, and improving the accuracy or
    objectivity of the research ratings.

    The proposals, available here
        http://www.hefce.ac.uk/research/assessment/reform/
    included much heavier use of metrics, including citation counts.

    Many bodies have now produced comments, many of them highly critical
    of proposals to make substantial use of metrics based on citation
    counts, grant funding etc.

    Some of the  background and criticisms are summarised in
    this report by the Times Higher Education Supplement:
    by Zoe Corbyn, on 28th Feb 2008, and
    this comment by Ian Marshall.

    Members of the UKCRC http://www.ukcrc.org.uk/, like many other
    interested groups, discussed the proposals, and I was one of many
    who circulated comments.

    My main criticism of the REF proposal was not that the proposed
    evaluation would be done in the wrong way but that its objectives
    were misguided and the whole exercise should be replaced as part of
    a better "joined-up" policy for funding and managing post school
    education as well as for research.

    The current leading universities would not favour my proposals
    because they would expect to lose out to supposedly less
    institutions, so there was no hope of getting my proposals forwarded
    through any academic body. Consequently I am making them available
    online here.

The need for better goals and assumptions
    The whole exercise starts from a flawed set of assumptions. The
    nation should decide how many properly resourced research+teaching
    universities it can afford on the basis of what it costs to support
    such organisations and the various long term and short term benefits
    they produce -- cultural and educational as well as economic, using
    an estimate of numbers of school leavers+late developers who are
    capable of benefitting from an intellectually very demanding
    post-school education, and the staff-student ratios suitable for
    teaching them well while doing world-class research.

    These teaching+research institutions could coexist with separate
    higher education teaching institutions (polytechnic universities?)
    doing what the best of the old polys used to do, with good 'slipway'
    mechanisms for transfer of students between them, and no penalties
    for losing students via the slipways.

    Both sets of institutions should be given adequate funding to do
    their jobs, with the option to compete for additional funding
    required for particularly expensive new projects (e.g. large cross
    disciplinary, cross-university, research projects). Some departments
    in old polys managed to get research grants and did excellent
    research. That possibility should remain.

Similar points were made in a letter in 2004 to my MP, Lynne Jones, about Top Up Fees, available here here.
Research evaluation should primarily provide feedback:
    Regular monitoring/review mechanisms would check whether individual
    university departments are spending their research money wisely and
    provide advice on how to improve or redirect what they are doing.

    A similar mechanism has been used for many years in schools and
    is often far more useful to schools, children and teachers than
    the current emphasis on numeric targets.

    That kind of in-depth, on-site, research review, giving detailed
    feedback, including constructive criticism, could be done at least
    once every three to five years for each department doing research.

    It could be done by a specially tailored collection of researchers
    from other institutions visiting the reviewed department and could
    include researchers from other disciplines, and, where appropriate,
    some people from industry.

    There might also be a nationally chosen panel of approved reviewers
    for each discipline, with members appointed by research councils
    and professional bodies.

    At least one member of a relevant panel should be on each review
    board. The department to be assessed should be able to select half
    the reviewers, the university management could appoint some, and the
    remainder could be nominated by the appropriate national panel (or
    panels) for the discipline (or disciplines) represented in the
    department. Variants could easily be devised to meet the
    requirements of highly interdisciplinary departments.

    Departments could provide reasons for objecting to particular
    nominated reviewers. [E.g. because of known animosities, or risks of
    'revenge' evaluations, or objections to qualifications.]

    Between the external reviews there should be at least one 'internal'
    research review run by the university's research management.

    This process might be costly in time, but probably no more costly
    overall than the RAE, and would have far more valuable effects than
    reviews whose only effect is to shift money around.

    Our department has nearly always found such external research
    evaluations (based in part on a day of presentations and
    discussions, as well as documentation), well worth the effort.
    I suspect others have also, but I have not done research to
    check this.

    Acting on recommendations of reviewers should not be compulsory, but
    full reasons for not following them should be made available both to
    the central authorities of the university and perhaps also to the
    national subject research panel.

    (E.g. a department that has decided to focus heavily on theoretical
    research might resist a recommendation to do more applied research,
    or vice versa. A department with a high proportion of
    interdisciplinary research might resist a recommendation to
    develop a stronger 'core' research portfolio. A judgement that
    some risky research is unlikely to succeed could be rejected as
    premature.)
Sanctions:
    Various sanctions could be available if a department receives
    repeated poor research evaluations after reviews where
    recommendations are not followed. University managements would be
    highly motivated to take action to preserve the reputation of the
    university.

    Financial penalties should be the last resort: intelligent managers
    do not try to fix something that's broken by removing the resources
    needed to fix it.

    Sacking, redeploying, or retiring, individuals who are not up to the
    job could come first! (Done as humanely as possible.)

    Many departments have in the past used mechanisms like giving poor
    researchers bigger teaching and admin loads, to help the better
    researchers. That option should remain available. It can be done in
    ways that make the less good researchers feel their teaching and
    admin contributions are highly valued.

    This recommendation to abandon the policy of using funding
    re-distribution to optimise research quality will not be popular
    with very successful departments who like the idea of continuing to
    get a larger than average share of the research funding.

    It's not clear that that's in the best interests of the nation, and
    it can be very unfair to excellent students and excellent young
    researchers who go to some of the less well funded departments, even
    if equal opportunities legislation does not (yet) identify that
    category of unequal treatment.

    Perhaps it should, making funding councils liable if their funding
    policies are the cause of the inequality!

    Of course, research funds from industry, and competitively awarded
    government funds for unusually large and expensive projects may
    inevitably produce some inequality. That could be a tolerable
    situation.
Why using RAE (or REF) primarily to determine funding is daft
    The growing use of simple numerical evaluations and rankings to
    determine funding for major national service bodies, including
    schools, universities, hospitals, police departments, etc. is daft
    because it is like building a huge ocean platform, or a major
    bridge, supported on pillars, doing regular inspections of the
    support pillars, and then shifting resources from the pillars that
    are in greatest danger of not doing their job to the pillars that
    are doing well.

    Of course, apart from automatic regular funding required to do its
    core research job, each department, and appropriate groups of
    researchers should be able to apply to research councils and other
    bodies for special funding for large projects requiring large
    expensive equipment, large amounts of additional manpower, etc.
    These would need to be regularly monitored to decide whether the
    funding should continue.

    If we want to encourage young researchers to be creative, and to
    open up new research territory, they need long term funding that can
    continue even while they are studying new possibilities, learning
    about other disciplines, developing new kinds of expertise,
    exploring new techniques, or new collaborations, even if they are
    not regularly spewing out highly rated publications. They should,
    however be able to give good accounts of what they are doing to
    visiting research panels, who may alos be able to help with
    constructive criticism and advice.

    My first lectureship post started in 1962. In the first two decades
    of my academic career, nobody hassled me about getting publications
    or grants. I wrote papers because I had had a good idea and polished
    it up, not because someone was nagging me to maximise research
    ratings for the department. I also spent a great deal of time
    attending seminars in other departments, learning about other
    disciplines, and developing new teaching materials and curricula
    reflecting what I had learnt about important future developments.

    Although I would have had a low research rating by any of the
    currently used or proposed criteria, I certainly did not waste my
    time, and my cross-disciplinary explorations laid the foundations
    for a great deal of productive research in the following decades,
    including the development of internationally known research
    and teaching centre.

    It is very sad that pressures to publish and get grants make that
    kind of career development almost impossible for the majority of
    young researchers nowadays. The harm it is doing to research and
    teaching is incalculable.
Comments and criticisms welcome
    Constructive comments and criticisms will be acknowledged, unless
    you ask not to be named.


Maintained by Aaron Sloman
School of Computer Science
The University of Birmingham