
From Aaron Mon Nov 20 23:49:15 GMT 1995
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References: <199511082348.SAA79587@atlanta.american.edu> <Pine.SUN.3.91.951109141527.7235E-100000@ucsbuxa.ucsb.edu> <480d0b$8u2@paladin.american.edu> <1995Nov10.223444.16241@media.mit.edu> <hefferma.816122674@pegasus.montclair.edu> <mfc3-1611951440430001@cu-dialup-1026.cit.cornell.edu>
Subject: Originality (Was Re: This whole Descartes thing)

A few minutes random browsing when I should have been doing some
other work revealed this gem, which has provoked me to comment.

mfc3@cornell.edu (Michael Canino) writes:
> Date: Thu, 16 Nov 1995 14:40:43 -0400
> Organization: Cornell University
> .....
> > In <1995Nov10.223444.16241@media.mit.edu> minsky@media.mit.edu (Marvin
> Minsky) writes:
> >
> > |Myself, I find it more interesting to figure things out than to look
> > |for answers in ancient books written by people who couldn't figure
> > |things out.
> > ....
>
> Of course when you consider how few original thoughts there have been in
> the millenia of human history, the odds really stack up against anyone
> saying anything that hasn't been said or thought by a person somewhere,
> sometime.

Depends on the kind of originality you look for. There are different
ways of being original. Here's a subset:

    1. Create a new well-formed sentence, never previously uttered.
       We probably all do this hundreds, if not, thousands, of times
       during a normal life-time. Your sentence and Minsky's could
       both be examples. (I once heard a child say: "Today
       might be much more hotter than it usually bees" I doubt that
       it has ever been said (spontaneously) before or since, apart
       from my reports of the utterance.

    2. Discover a surprising and useful new consequence of what was
       previously known. I suppose good mathematicians achieve this
       quite often. It's also the task of a good programmer.

    3.a. Ask a new question whose answer turns out to have all sorts
       of important consequences. (E.g. why do apples disconnected
       from trees tend to move, rather than remain where they are?)

    3.b. Formulate a deep conjecture about the answer to a question
       of type 3. A deep conjecture is one that tends to generate
       major new investigations in pursuit of ways of testing the
       conjecture. (3.a. and 3.b. are two sides of the same coin.)
       (This concept of "depth" requires further clarification,
       which I'll not offer now.)

    4. Create an extension to an existing language, which enables
       new things to be said, new questions, to be asked, and new
       derivations, to be formulated, which were previously
       inexpressible.
       A simple version of this merely extends the vocabulary by
       adding some word or phrase not definable in terms of
       pre-existing concepts. A deep extension typically adds a
       major family of new concepts extending pre-existing
       ontologies in powerful ways, e.g. by providing new forms of
       explanation for previously known phenomena.
       An example is the extension of common sense (pre-scientfic)
       language with concepts referring to the hidden (unobservable)
       constituents of matter.
       Another example is the extension of common sense knowledge of
       reproduction and family resemblances, with concepts within a
       theory about collections of genes within individuals and
       populations and mechanisms for extending and filtering a
       gene-pool.

        (All this is inconsistent with Fodor's idea of a language
        of thought. For that rules out certain kinds of novelty.)

    5. Create an extension not merely to the vocabulary and concepts
       and theories, but also to the forms of expression and
       manipulation of those forms, e.g. in reasoning. This
       typically involves creating new forms of syntax. E.g. the
       invention of differential and integral calculus made possible
       new forms of expression and derivation. Tensor calculus was
       another example. Contour lines on maps were another example.
       New forms of logic (e.g. parametrised modal logics?) are
       another. New programming languages can also do this: e.g.
       higher order functional languages, object-oriented languages
       graphical programming languages. Languages for specifying
       asynchronous concurrent processes. (Apart from the last, all
       of these are subsumed by the expressive power of Turing
       machines, though some specialised notations extend heuristic
       power beyond Turing machines for specific classes of
       problems).

    6. Creation of totally new forms of expression and derivation,
       which are not simply extensions of previous ones. It is
       arguable, for example, that the forms of parallel distributed
       representation used in neural nets are not just an extension
       of logic and familiar forms of computation, but a parallel
       development. Will quantum computation be another?

    7. Creation of a new medium within which to explore varieties of
       forms of representation supporting all the other forms of
       originality. I suspect that this point is the most important
       feature of computing machinery: computers provide us with new
       ways of inventing, implementing, and exploring new virtual
       machines, providing media for new forms of representation.
       Previously we were restricted to 2-D surfaces, 3-D
       structures, patterns of change in 2-D or 3-D, and perhaps
       acoustic patterns also. Richer and more varied topologies can
       be embedded in virtual computing machines (e.g. actual
       manipulable lists which contain themselves as elements could
       not exist previously -- now they are easy to make).


The types of novelty in points 1 through 7 are arranged in roughly
increasing power of the new development. E.g. providing a new medium can
sometimes provide support for a raft of new languages, extending what we
can think, and and what we can do, more than any theory expressed in a
pre-existing language can.

(I first tried to spell all this out in chapter 2 of The Computer
Revolution in Philosophy. Others have made similar points. My main
claim was that the most important discoveries in science are not
discoveries of new laws or theories, but the discovery of new
ranges of possibilities, about which various laws or theories
could be formulated. This deepens our knowledge of the "form" of
the world, as opposed to its "contents" or its "constraints" -- the
laws.)

But there's much more to be said, as usual.
Aaron
